{"id":20287,"date":"2026-01-15T15:47:57","date_gmt":"2026-01-15T13:47:57","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/idis.gr\/?p=20287"},"modified":"2026-01-15T15:59:28","modified_gmt":"2026-01-15T13:59:28","slug":"idis-college-year-in-athens-international-perceptions-of-the-russia-ukraine-war-the-positions-of-india-lebanon-and-georgia","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/idis.gr\/en\/idis-college-year-in-athens-international-perceptions-of-the-russia-ukraine-war-the-positions-of-india-lebanon-and-georgia\/","title":{"rendered":"IDIS-College Year in Athens:\u00a0 International perceptions of the Russia-Ukraine War: The positions of India, Lebanon and Georgia"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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Introduction<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

During the course of the Fall 2025 semester, a research cohort of eight undergraduate
students from universities across the United States partnered with the Institute of International
Relations to examine how states spanning diverse regions have positioned themselves in
response to two of the most consequential contemporary conflicts: the Russia-Ukraine war and
the Israel-Palestine crisis. This project marked the first formal collaborative endeavor between
College Year in Athens (CYA) and IDIS, establishing a foundation for future academic
partnerships that will enable American students to directly engage with foreign policy
scholarship in Greece while simultaneously cultivating research skills in a cross-cultural
academic environment.
The primary objective of the cohort\u2019s research was to assess the political, strategic, and
domestic considerations shaping national responses to these conflicts. Rather than evaluating
states\u2019 positions through mere normative judgments, the project sought to identify the underlying
drivers of geopolitical posturing\u2013whether rooted in economic dependencies, security concerns,
ideological narratives, domestic political constraints, or broader geostrategic ambitions within
the international system. Subsequently, the cohort analyzed the official and informal stances of a
diverse assortment of countries, including China, Israel, India, Japan, Lebanon, Spain, Georgia,
and Germany\u2013ultimately reflecting a comprehensive spectrum of regional contexts and levels of
power.
Methodologically, the research entailed a systematic analysis of international and local
news coverage, official statements from governments, and policy-relevant reporting. This<\/p>\n\n\n\n

approach enabled the group to monitor both formal diplomatic positions and adaptive political
rhetoric across countries as real-time developments with peace negotiations unfolded. Thus, the
cohort was able to capture how states communicate their geopolitical priorities to domestic and
international audiences amid evolving foreign conflicts. By synthesizing media discourse across
regions, the researchers aimed to bridge academic analysis with policy-pertinent
insight\u2013producing findings accessible to both scholars and practitioners.
This article highlights three case studies\u2013India, Lebanon, and Georgia\u2013as illustrative
examples of the broader research undertaken during the internship. Collectively, these cases
demonstrate how states with varying logistical capacities, regional pressures, and historical
experiences navigate global conflicts in ways that often diverge from external expectations or
stated principles. These cases, therefore, underscore the complexity of contemporary foreign
policy decision-making and the necessity of contextual, independent case-driven analysis when
evaluating international responses to global crises.
The cohort is exceedingly grateful for the opportunity to collaborate with and learn from
mentors at the Institute for International Relations, and we look forward to seeing how future
CYA students will continue the partnership and enhance their comprehension of foreign affairs
through further engagement with IDIS.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

India<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Indian foreign policy is fundamentally driven by ambitions to become a \u201cgreat power\u201d;
subsequently, India seeks to project influence on the international stage and promote a
multi-polar global order. Although the US has sought to court India through robust diplomatic
engagement as a means to counter China, India strategically balances its relations with Western<\/p>\n\n\n\n

and non-Western allies to advance its own geopolitical standing. This posturing has shaped
India\u2019s ambivalent stance towards the Russian invasion of Ukraine, despite India\u2019s schema that
it\u2013as the historic pioneer of the Non-Aligned Movement\u2013is the leader of anti-imperialist,
anti-occupation movements. Thus, while India outwardly frames itself as being a \u201cchampion
against imperialism\u201d, in-practice India will disregard these alleged values in order to advance its
objective of balancing the West and elevating its own geopolitical status. This ultimately
suggests that a realist paradigm is necessary for evaluating India\u2019s perspective on the
Russian-Ukraine War.
Despite Indian framing that its foreign policy is driven by constructivist ideals, Modi\u2019s
geopolitical maneuvering suggests that realpolitik aspirations of countering the West dominate
Indian grand strategy. From the onset of the war, India has sought to project neutrality, as New
Delhi abstained from all UN resolutions pertaining to the conflict and has refused to publicly
condemn Russian aggression. Yet, India has become the top consumer of Russian seaborne oil in
spite of Western-imposed sanctions\u2013effectively sustaining Russia\u2019s war-effort. Modi also
lavishly welcomed Putin in a visit to New Delhi in December, providing Putin an international
platform to co-opt the narrative surrounding the war. Aiding the Russian economy and
diplomatically embracing Moscow despite its global isolation curtails an outright defeat in
Ukraine\u2013a paramount condition for upholding a \u201cmultipolar\u201d international order, as Russia
presents a prominent pole against the West. By supporting Moscow, India negates its ostensible
neutrality by seeking to erode the US-led global system, thus preponderating its constructivist
rhetoric in favor of realpolitik, great power aspirations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lebanon<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Lebanese foreign policy traditionally reflects the country\u2019s internal fragmentation and
pragmatic balancing, often constrained by sectarian politics and security pressures emanating
from the Israel\u2013Hezbollah front. Unlike major regional actors whose responses to the Russian
invasion of Ukraine are shaped by grand strategic aims, Lebanon\u2019s engagement with the conflict
has been marginal and largely rhetorical rather than operational. Historically, Beirut\u2019s
government formally condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, calling for an
immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of Russian forces, a position that underscored
adherence to principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity even at the cost of diplomatic
unease with Moscow.
Despite this early condemnation, Lebanon\u2019s official posture over the last three months
has remained largely silent on the Ukraine war, with no substantive statements from the
presidency or foreign ministry actively shaping discourse on the conflict. Lebanon\u2019s diplomatic
bandwidth has been consumed by existential challenges, including managing fragile ceasefire
talks with Israel and the contentious push to disarm Hezbollah, eclipsing any ambition to
influence global power politics. Recent diplomatic activity, such as the foreign minister declining
an invitation to Tehran in favor of neutral-ground talks, suggests a cautious non-alignment
designed to avoid embroiling Beirut in wider geopolitical rivalries.
At the non-state level, Hezbollah\u2019s stance illustrates the informal ideological vector
within Lebanon\u2019s politics. The group\u2019s rhetoric and media output have periodically echoed
narratives sympathetic to Russia\u2019s strategic framing, critiquing Western dominance and
lamenting Lebanon\u2019s earlier condemnation of Moscow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Georgia<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Since the start of the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2022, Georgia has taken a relatively
supportive stance towards Ukraine. In May 2022, Georgia\u2019s Prime Minister, Irakli Garibashvili,
condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine, describing it as a violation of international law and
the UN charter. Since then, Georgia has signed onto hundreds of resolutions in support of
Ukraine. The nation has provided substantial support for Ukrainians affected by the war,
allowing hundreds of thousands to cross into Georgia; tens of thousands still remain in the
country today. Georgia has provided financial support to these refugees, amounting to 300 GEL
per family and 45 GEL per individual, as well as access to microcredit loans. Georgia\u2019s support
for Ukraine is unsurprising, as Georgia was also the victim of Russian military expansionism in
the 2008 Russo-Georgian War.
While Georgia has provided political support for Ukraine and financial support to its
refugees, it has neglected to take more decisive action against Russia. Georgia has refused to
send military aid to Ukraine or to impose economic sanctions on Russia. Additionally, Georgia
ignored pressure from Ukraine and the West to open a second front against Russia, in order to
relieve the pressure on Ukraine. These actions make sense for Georgia, as it is at particularly
high risk of being affected by Russian military action and is economically reliant on Russia.
Overall, Georgia has been a supporter of Ukraine in its war with Russia, but has had to limit its
tangible support for Ukraine out of its own economic and security concerns.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n
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Introduction During the course of the Fall 2025 semester, a research cohort of eight undergraduatestudents from universities across the United States partnered with the Institute of InternationalRelations to examine how states spanning diverse regions have positioned themselves inresponse to two of the most consequential contemporary conflicts: the Russia-Ukraine war andthe Israel-Palestine crisis. This project marked … Read more<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":20303,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[112],"tags":[],"event-year":[],"class_list":["post-20287","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-latest-news"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/idis.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/20287","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/idis.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/idis.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/idis.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/idis.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=20287"}],"version-history":[{"count":6,"href":"https:\/\/idis.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/20287\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":20307,"href":"https:\/\/idis.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/20287\/revisions\/20307"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/idis.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/20303"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/idis.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=20287"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/idis.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=20287"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/idis.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=20287"},{"taxonomy":"event-year","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/idis.gr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/event-year?post=20287"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}