

ISIS AND THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF
COUNTER-TERRORISM IN EUROPEAN UNION

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Thessaloniki, 2024

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ISIS and the Institutional Framework of Counter-Terrorism in European Union

Chapter 1

Islamic State (ISIS)

The Islamic State, a terrorist group, originated as a violent extremist organization that underwent several name changes reflecting its territorial focus. Usama Bin Laden and Musab Al-Zarqawi shared the goal of establishing the Islamic State, differing only in Zarqawi's intent to impose it on all Muslims under his leadership. The fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq led to the recruitment of dismissed Sunni military personnel into groups like Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and later ISIS. In 2013, Al-Nusra Front disputed Al-Qaeda due to Baghdadi's declaration of a unified group, leading to tensions and battles between Al-Nusra and ISIS. By 2014, ISIS expelled Al-Nusra from Syria, causing over 3,000 fighters' deaths in their conflicts. In 2015, Al-Zawahiri suggested cooperation between Al-Qaeda and ISIS against external enemies.

Ideological Structure. The Islamic State's ideology evolved mostly when Zarqawi had that vision about the Caliphate. He wanted to achieve two main doctrines: anti-Shi'ism and the restoration of the Caliphate. While Al-Qaeda did not even interpret so extreme Salafism, ISIS called for execution of Shias in Iraq, apostates and atheists and eventually ISIS claimed to fight against every single one who is considered to be against its cause¹. At a first glance, the ISIS ideology of salafi-jihadism may seem indistinguishable from that of Al-Qaeda. Both interpret the political decision making based on the sharia law. Furthermore, ISIS is a transnational Sunni insurgent group that believes on Salafism and on Takfirism. For many Middle East countries

¹ Andrew Silke, «*Routledge Handbook of Terrorism and Counter-terrorism*», 2020, Routledge.

«Salafism» is tolerated, because those countries interpret Islam in many different ways, but they believe that «Takfirism» is way to violent and indiscriminate violence and atrocities against non-sunnis are unacceptable². Regarding takfirism, ISIS' ideology holds that Islam must be cleaned from muslims that do not strictly follow the rules enacted by the IS. However, ISIS proclamation of takfirism does not only stop to Islam's strictions, but extends also to other muslims who stray of IS' ideological precepts. In IS creed, states that embrace democracy and secularism and all governments that do not follow the sharia law, are considered as apostates, fact that for IS legitimizes killings³.

The other strand that contributed to ISIS' ideology was Ba'athism, evident in its organization and political objectives. Besides the religious ideology, the Islamic State promised their recruits an exciting and adventurous life and action, ensuring that every fighter would get a woman for himself as a gift for their services⁴.

Organizational Structure

In order to achieve its caliphate ambitions, ISIS has its own Chain of Command and Command and Control. Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi was self-appointed Caliph, who governed and ruled with his own advisers, regional and operational and provincial councils. Thus, inside the terrorist group there is this top-to-down leadership organizational structure and right under the Caliph sit the Shura and Sharia Councils. Those two councils oversee both the compliance and the

²Andrew Silke, *ibid*, 3.

³M.W & R.L B, «*ISIS: Its History, Ideology, and Psychology*», Handbook of Contemporary Islam and Muslim lives, 2018, Springer.

⁴Godfrey Garner & Maeghin Alarid-Hughes, *op.cit* 7

actions of the parts of the group's activities with Sharia law. Moreover, these two councils supervise the military and the intelligence gathering operations and the administrative orders of the group, including asserting and maintaining its territories or attacking to gain new ones. Although its middle power structure is similar to Al-Qaeda's one, ISIS has divided its territories into several provinces led by a governor who controlled a local structure of councils.

Continuing on, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi had two senior deputies named Abu Muslim al-Turkmani, a former Iraqi Military Intelligence Officer who is a supervisor to the Iraqi province, and Abu Ali al-Anbari, who was former Iraqi Military Officer and oversees Syrian province and both are Baathist Party members. Those two deputies in consultation with their leader organize the objectives that are carried out. Those two commanders under Baghdadi's command and twelve more sub-commanders are both in Iraq and Syria. Those three men consisted the executive authority inside the terrorist group. Right below those three men, there are several regional groups whose responsibilities are to carry out espionage operations, law enforcement inside ISIS' territory, recruitments, financial ruling and intelligence gathering. Those communities inside ISIS mostly came from Saddam Housein's dissolved army⁵.

Since the death of al-Baghdadi at the hands of US Combat Applications Group, also known as Delta Force, in 2019, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi has undertook the leadership of the terrorist group.

ISIS' Operations

Despite the fact that ISIS is not a legitimate state, it has yet managed to govern its claimed provinces. Trying to act like a legally established state, IS wants to settle an official-looking

⁵Jason M. Breslow, «*How Saddam's Former Soldiers Are Fueling The Rise Of ISIS*», October 28, 2014.

government structure, including media where its terrorists can share their propaganda. However, talking about operations refers mostly in the domains of military operations.

Military Operations

ISIS, also known as the Islamic State, attempts to establish itself as a legitimate state in the Middle East region, operating its own defense ministry referred to as the "war office," reporting directly to its self-proclaimed caliph. This ministry oversees the execution of attack plans and all combat operations. However, it's important to note that the war minister does not hold the second-in-command position within ISIS' hierarchical structure. ISIS generates revenue within its territory by collecting taxes from the populace, which is then invested in events to propagate its interpretation of Islamic laws.

Understanding ISIS' military identity requires separating it into two chronological periods. Before declaring itself a caliphate, ISIS operated similarly to its predecessor, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), utilizing improvised explosive devices, ambush tactics, and conducting surveillance operations among local populations. Post-2014, ISIS expanded its operational activities beyond its territorial borders, engaging in conventional warfare tactics. However, after losing most of its territory in 2017 due to intensified pressure from NATO forces, ISIS reverted to unconventional warfare tactics previously used by AQI, hiding among local populations in urban areas like Mosul.

Online Propaganda

ISIS, also known as the Islamic State, weaponizes media as a "Weapon of Mass Destruction," investing heavily in anti-Western propaganda. Their brutal executions gained attention in 2014, and their use of social media platforms like Twitter for recruitment poses challenges for governments in combating extremist messages. Transitioning to Telegram, ISIS utilizes its encrypted communication features, including chat rooms with up to 10,000 participants sharing

propaganda videos securely. This encryption makes it difficult for intelligence services to track and trace messages, complicating efforts to disrupt communications. To address this, the European Convention on Cybercrime criminalizes the dissemination of hate speech online, aiding in combating radicalization. The loss of Raqqa, ISIS's capital, in October 2017 significantly impacted its online propaganda campaign, leading to the loss of all live al-Bayan transmissions by October 2017.

Funding Operations

According to research, the Islamic State (IS) spent an estimated US\$5.6 million per month or US\$70 million annually in 2016 in the eastern Syrian province of Deir az-Zor alone. These funds were allocated for creating propaganda videos and purchasing weapons.

The United States Department of Treasury has reported that IS earns a substantial amount of money through criminal activities, including robberies, extortions, kidnappings, oil and weapons smuggling, and counterfeiting pharmaceuticals and currency. Keith Crane's study highlighted IS's focus on the hydrocarbon sector in the Middle East, with attacks on or control over infrastructure in Libya, Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. Crane estimated that IS generated US\$40 million per month from the sale of oil and refined oil in 2015.

Additionally, IS derived revenue from the sales of antiquities. By 2015, the group controlled over 4,500 archaeological sites in Iraq, many of which were UNESCO World Heritage Sites. Money laundering and terrorism financing pose significant concerns for the European economy and citizen security. Since 2018, the European Union has implemented numerous anti-money laundering regulations to prevent the hiding of illicit funds by fictitious companies.

As IS expanded its territory and increased its troop numbers, its financial gains grew significantly. Reports indicate that IS paid its fighters monthly salaries ranging from \$350 to \$500. With an estimated 20,000 to 30,000 fighters in 2015, IS's expenditure on salaries alone could have reached around \$10 million per month. This financial capacity allowed IS to sustain

its operations and attract recruits, highlighting the importance of disrupting its revenue streams in combating the group effectively.

Chapter 2

European Union's Counter-Terrorism Policy

«In an area where clarity of roles and responsibilities are vital, we found the structures within the EU for combating terrorism.», House of Lords, European Committee.

Over the last decade, minor terrorist attacks have increased across the European Union, affecting countries like Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Italy. In 2021 alone, terrorist attacks in EU countries resulted in 21 deaths and over 54 injuries. In 2020, Islamist terror attacks claimed 12 lives and left more than 47 severely injured, with four jihadist plots uncovered in Belgium, Germany, and France.

Historically, counter-terrorism frameworks have been dominated by the criminal justice and military models. However, modern counter-terrorism policies cannot be confined to these approaches. The criminal justice model treats terrorism as an ordinary crime, focusing on criminal motives rather than political or ideological perspectives. The military model views terrorism as an act of war or insurgency, a perspective often adopted by the EU.

The EU has developed a counter-terrorism strategy that some view as weak and futile while others see as preventive and adequate. Before addressing policies, defining "terrorism" within the EU's playbook is crucial. Following the September 11th attacks, the EU redefined terrorism, outlining actions designated as terrorist acts in the Council Framework Decision on combating terrorism (2002.475/JHA).

These actions include attacks on individuals' lives or physical integrity, kidnapping/hostage-taking, destruction of government/public infrastructure, and possession of weapons/explosives, among others. The EU's definition closely aligns with the UK's Terrorism

Act 2000. Moving forward, understanding the strategic context of EU counter-terrorism is essential for effective policy development.

The Development Of EU's Policy

When the European Union began its service, it was more an economical union for the member-states. That meant that emphasis on other sectors of politics whether were not fully developed or did not even exist. The counter-terrorism policies were given significant attention not only after the Lisbon Treaty, but most importantly after the tragic events of 9/11, the Madrid attacks in 2004 and the London bombing in 2005.

Pre-9/11 EU's CT Strategy.

In regard of 9/11 attacks, Madrid and London attacks, the common consensus of the European states to increase the counter-terrorism policy as an ensemble came after the needed response of some attacks carried out by organizations from Western Europe and Middle East and from IRA in Ireland⁶.

Hence, in order to tackle regionally terrorism, the Terrorism, Radicalization, Extremism, and Political Violence Group was founded in 1975, upon a Dutch initiative by European police officials. Its goal was to exchange ideas and political opinions on how to fight terrorism. A next step was made after the signing of the Schengen Agreement in 1985 and a bigger one was made

⁶Doyle Leonard, "Fears grow as EU police forces forge secret links: Report cites lack of accountability and data protection.", 1993, INDEPEDENT. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/fears-grow-as-eu-police-forces-forge-secret-links-report-cites-lack-of-accountability-and-data-protection-1465695.html>

after the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 as the TREVI framework was inducted inside the Justice and Home Affairs sector.⁷

Post-9/11 EU's CT Strategy

Following the 9/11 attacks, both Europe and North America prioritized counter-terrorism efforts, realizing the vulnerability to such threats. The European Union swiftly responded by adopting an Action Plan on Combating Terrorism in November 2001. This was followed by the EU Council's Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism in June 2002, marking terrorism as a special offense in all member states. The EU was the first to define and reach a mutual conclusion on the term "terrorism." Additionally, the European Arrest Warrant and the Counter-Terrorism Group were introduced.

The Counter-Terrorism Group facilitated cooperation among counter-terrorism police and military units across member states. The Council's Working Groups on Terrorism expanded, including the 3rd Pillar Council Working Group on Terrorism (TWG) and 2nd Pillar Council Working Group on Terrorism (COTER). Furthermore, the European Commission's JLS Directorate General and its Unit D-1 were reorganized to oversee policy formation on terrorism.

Under the 3rd Pillar Article 36 Committee, member states were empowered with the legal framework to conduct investigations into terrorist suspects and share information among intelligence agencies and Europol, enhancing coordination and information sharing in counter-terrorism efforts.

⁷Oldrich Bures, «*EU Counterterrorism Policy: A Paper Tiger?*», 2006, Terrorism and Political Violence.

Post-Madrid and London Attacks Policy

When the Madrid and the London attacks happened, the Europeans understood that now terrorism is brought in their soil and the fear and insecurity that never expected to feel was there. Right after the attack in Madrid, the European Council adopted the Declaration on Combating Terrorism, which forced Member States to implement the remaining provisions agreed upon 9/11⁸. Also, the Action Plan was immediately expanded inserting 175 additional provisions.

When the London bombings occurred, the UK government extended the police's powers in to surveil personal communication data and exchange these among national forces, including the military, inter alia through the European Evidence Warrant and Communication Data Retention legislation⁹. After these two attacks, EU understood that the borders must be more secure and stop terrorists from crossing them. So, in order to protect the borders, EU created Frontex in 2005. It's role is to prevent illegal immigration and Frontex's role in preventing terrorism was established in the 2005 EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy¹⁰.

Furthermore, besides the Action Plan, the Member States agreed to appoint a counter-Terrorism Coordinator, who would be integrated under the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. The main tasks of his would be the monitoring of the

⁸European Council, «*Declaration on Combating Terrorism*», 2004, Brussels.

⁹European Parliament and Council of the European Union, «*Directive 2006/24/EC of 15 March 2006 on the 163 retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC*», 2006, Brussels, Official Journal of the European Union, L 105.

¹⁰Council of the European Union, “The European Union Counter-terrorism strategy”, 2005, Brussels, 14469/4/05.

implementation of the Action Plan by Member States as well as increasing the communication with the European Council.

Year	EU Action Plan on Combating Terrorism (Measures/Actions)
2001	41
2002-2003	64
2004	164
2005	203
2006	138
2007-2009	139
2010-2012	37

Table 1: The EU Action Plan on Counter-Terrorism- Council of the European Union Public Register; "EU ACTION PLAN ON COMBATING TERRORISM".

Legal Framework For CT Operations

Between mid-2014 and end-2017, at least 52 terrorist attacks occurred in Europe due to a lack of operational coordination among Western countries, as reported by a European Parliament briefing. The European Union's legal policy framework for counter-terrorism is primarily based on Title V of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which addresses the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice. Article 83 of the TFEU designates terrorism as a serious cross-border crime.

However, counter-terrorism measures undertaken by the EU must also comply with fundamental rights outlined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, including privacy and data rights. Key legislations in this regard include the General Data Protection Regulation and the Data Protection Police Directive, enacted in 2018, which aim to protect individuals' data during criminal investigations. Member states are obligated to adhere to the European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in counter-terrorism efforts.

Additionally, the EU has the authority, under Article 222 of the TFEU, to utilize all available resources, including military units of member states, to prevent or respond to terrorist attacks. The Lisbon Treaty of 2007 introduced internal reforms to counter-terrorism policies,

abandoning the third-pillar structure and granting the European Commission new competences in Justice and Home Affairs, focusing on both internal and external aspects of counter-terrorism.

European Union's Strategy

The European Union (EU) established a comprehensive counter-terrorism policy after the November 30, 2005, London attacks. Initially focusing on prevent, protect, pursue, and respond pillars, the strategy evolved post-2014 due to ISIS's territorial expansion. The "prevent" pillar targets radicalization within member states, aiming to de-radicalize individuals and address root causes. The "protect" pillar enhances defense through police and judiciary cooperation, with measures by the Euro Border Agency. "Pursue" combats terrorism globally, focusing on preventing travel planning and intelligence sharing via institutions like Europol. The "response" pillar improves coordination to minimize attack consequences.

Despite progress, challenges persist, including bureaucratic inefficiencies and coordination gaps. Efforts continue to enhance information exchange and cooperation to address evolving terrorism threats.

EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator

Following the London bombings, the European Union's Counter-Terrorism policy witnessed a significant shift with the appointment of Gijs de Vries as Counter-Terrorism Coordinator. Despite only 25 governments taking his role seriously, de Vries successfully influenced the Union to develop new counter-terrorism policies, including measures to curb terrorism funding. Emphasizing the need for stronger cooperation between the Commission and Council, de Vries advocates for increased roles of EU member-states in countering terrorism and enhancing their capacity to respond effectively to terrorist attacks¹¹.

¹¹Daniel Koehane, «*the EU and Counter-Terrorism*», 2005, Centre for European Reform.

Europol

Europol, representing the European Police, began addressing Islamic terrorism in 2000. Following the European Council's 2005 decision, EU countries were mandated to inform Europol of ongoing investigations due to insufficient cooperation. The relationship between EU countries and Europol involves two key components. Firstly, Europol national units and liaison officers in The Hague maintain updates on member states' work and bridge communication between Europol and national police authorities. Secondly, Europol operates based on Article 3 of the European Convention, allowing it to gather and analyze intelligence, conduct investigations in member states, and coordinate operations by providing necessary information to law enforcement units.

Despite its extensive counter-terrorism mandate, Europol is perceived as a weak actor due to two main reasons. Firstly, member states lack trust in Europol, and secondly, Europol lacks international powers under current EU treaties, leading to underutilization in counter-terrorism efforts.

Additionally, Europol has endeavored to collaborate with third countries such as Iraq, Israel, Morocco, and Egypt. This collaboration involves operational agreements for exchanging personal data and strategic agreements that extend beyond data exchange. Despite its perceived weaknesses, Europol remains committed to contributing to the global fight against terrorism through various initiatives.

European Counter-Terrorism Centre

Since ISIS began to carry out terrorist attacks in Europe, the need of creating a centralized hub with experienced and specialized personnel in counter-terrorism was initiated by Europol. So, in January of 2016 Europol established the European Counter-Terrorism Centre or ECTC,

which is an operations center of expertise that reflects the continuous need for the European Union to tackle terrorism.

Therefore, ECTC was initially designed for providing operational support upon a request from a EU member-state for investigations, tackling foreign fighters, sharing intelligence on terrorism financing, curbing online propaganda and illegal arms trafficking and cooperate transnationally with member-states authorities¹².

Operationally, ECTC's role is to double check the data received by Europol and establish networks that provide intelligence sent back to Europol. In order though to accomplice that, ECTC has formed specialized teams that contribute to this cause. These teams are consisted of specialized analysts and experts and their job is to collect and send needed intelligence for operations conducted by member-states. Thus, ECTC cooperates closely with the European Cybercrime Centre or EC3 and the European Migrant Smuggling Centre or EMSC, in order to have a wider perspective in those operations.

European Council

The European Council convenes interior and foreign affairs ministers to initiate political initiatives and define strategic guidelines for the European Union's overall development. Operating under the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice, it plays a vital role in shaping

¹²European Counter-Terrorism Centre, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/european-counter-terrorism-centre-ectc>

measures against terrorism, assisting institutions like Europol in the ongoing fight against security threats.^{13 14}

EU's RESPONSE to Paris Attacks

In response to the 2015 Paris attacks, the European Union (EU) focused on reinforcing existing priorities and implementing new measures. Key efforts included intensifying the use of tools like SIS II for enhanced checks at external borders and monitoring foreign fighters. The EU heightened aviation security checks, reassessed risk management for terminal security, and discussed the creation of a "European Border Guard" to enhance cross-border police cooperation. Additionally, the role of Joint Investigation Teams was promoted for investigating cross-border crimes.¹⁵

Measures Need To Be Taken

The European Union's counter-terrorism strategy has faced criticism for its reactive nature, responding to events rather than proactively addressing emerging threats. Europol's involvement dates back to 1999, with increased focus on Islamic terrorism post-9/11. However,

¹³Treaty of Functioning of the European Law, Article 68.

¹⁴European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C: Citizen's Rights and Consti 215 - tutional Affairs, Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 2017, "The European Union's Policies on Counter-terrorism Relevance, Coherence and Effectiveness", p. 50

¹⁵European Council No. 1987/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on the establishment, operation and use of the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II), OJ L 381, 28.12.2006; and Council Decision 2007/533/JHA of 12 June 2007 on the establishment, operation and use of the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II), OJ L 205, 7.8.2007.

maintaining consistent authority and organizational stability has been challenging for the organization.

Achieving unified objectives among EU member states regarding Islamic terrorism is crucial for developing effective long-term strategies. This requires collective acknowledgment of the threat and commitment to coordinated action. Leveraging EU foreign policy to promote democratic reforms in Muslim-majority countries can address underlying grievances fueling extremism.

Enhancing law enforcement cooperation and intelligence sharing among member states is vital for preventing terrorist activities. Bilateral and multilateral training of counter-terrorism units can increase preparedness across the EU. Improved diplomatic relations with Muslim-majority nations are also essential for fostering international collaboration. The 2015 Paris attacks underscored the need to reassess and improve the EU's counter-terrorism procedures, including conducting thorough threat assessments and identifying effective prevention strategies.

Enhanced cooperation between EU institutions like Europol and Eurojust is necessary for facilitating joint investigations and overcoming operational obstacles. Addressing legal uncertainties and harmonizing criminal justice standards are critical for improving collaboration and ensuring efficient functioning of joint investigation teams (JITs) within national legal frameworks. A shift towards a proactive, operational approach guided by EU legal provisions is necessary to mitigate the terrorism threat effectively and protect EU citizens.

.Chapter 3

Greece's Counter-Terrorism Doctrine

«We honor the memory of terrorism's victims and we send a message to the Greek people that the fight against terrorism is abiding.», Greek Defense Minister, Nick Dendias.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

Greece has fortunately not experienced jihadist terrorist attacks, but it has faced wing-leftist terrorist incidents by a group called 17th November (17N) from the mid-1970s to the early 2000s. These attacks prompted Greece to develop its counter-terrorism policies, especially after the assassination of Pavlos Bakoyannis, the chief parliamentary spokesman of the New Democracy Party, which led to the introduction of the anti-terrorism law known as "Bill for Protection and Society Against Organized Crime" (Law 1916/1990). This law empowered police forces to gather intelligence, charge suspects without concrete evidence, and provided protection to judges and their families while restricting the press from publishing terrorist group proclamations.

In June 2001, the PASOK government introduced a comprehensive counter-terrorism law, granting the police and National Intelligence Service authority to collect personal data, conduct covert surveillance, and carry out telephone hearings. This law also established Greece's first witness protection program and included amnesty provisions.

In preparation for hosting the 2004 Olympics, Greece enacted additional laws such as Law 3691/2008 on "Preventing and Suppression of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing," which aimed to combat financial support for terrorism. Furthermore, Greece

accepted Law 3663/2008 of EUROJUST, Joint Investigation Teams (JIT), and other provisions, allowing these entities to conduct investigations within Greek territory if necessary.

Despite not facing jihadist attacks, Greece has invested time and resources in curbing terrorist organizations and addressing the issue of foreign fighters transiting through its borders to other European countries. These legislative measures and cooperation with international entities demonstrate Greece's commitment to combating terrorism and ensuring the safety and security of its citizens and visitors.

Institutions Dealing With Terrorism

The Hellenic/Greek Police Corps, along with the Hellenic/Greek Coast Guard Underwater Demolition Teams, are responsible for conducting counter-terrorism operations throughout Greek territory. Within the structure of the Hellenic Police, five Police Directorates oversee various aspects of counter-terrorism operations.

The State Security Directorate is responsible for enforcing the rule of law, while the Directorate for Countering Special Violent Crimes, also known as the "Anti-Terrorism Agency," focuses on preventing and suppressing terrorism activities domestically and abroad. This agency works closely with other departments such as the Department for Countering Internal Terrorism, Department for International Terrorism, and Department for Countering Other Violent Crimes.

The Police Directorate of Information Management collects, analyzes, and disseminates intelligence related to terrorism activities in collaboration with other organizations. Additionally, the Directorate of Criminal Investigations stores DNA samples and fingerprints to support investigations. The primary counter-terrorism units are the "Special Suppressive Counter-Terrorism Unit" (EKAM) on land, under the Greek Police, and the Underwater Demolition Unit (MYA) at sea, under the Greek Coast Guard.

Ministry Of Civil Protection

Prevention and deterrence of delinquency is based on a critical level on policing and on utilizing the competent forces that increase the deterrence capabilities of the police. Thus, this is the reason that the main priority is the reinforcement of police equipment in order to achieve the maximum utilization in counter-terrorism operations.

In 2020, there has been a reformation in that direction. Law 4662/2020 introduced the settlement of the “National Crisis and Hazard Management Mechanism”¹⁶. This is the main step, after many years, to increase the procedure on crisis of internal security. So, under the Minister of Citizen Protection, the “Coordination Office of Homeland Security and Crisis Management” is established based on Law 4249/2014¹⁷, alongside with the upgrade of the “National Coordination Centre for Operations and Crisis Management” of Greek Police.

¹⁶White Bible for the Protection of the Citizens, Hellenic Democracy, Ministry of Civil Protection.

¹⁷[Article 61 - Law 4249/2014 – Coordination Office of Homeland Security and Crisis Management | Legislation](#)
| Lawspot

Conclusions

After analyzing and elucidating the major counter-terrorism policies implemented by countries most affected by Islamist terror attacks, it is evident that, despite sharing a common foreign policy within the European Union, each nation has distinct obligations in executing counter-terrorism operations and legitimizing anti-terrorism laws to protect their citizens.

Living in extraordinary times, the imperative for robust anti-terrorism legislation is escalating daily. Nations must adapt and refine their counter-terrorism laws, fostering communication and cooperation to preempt terrorist attacks collectively.

The primary goal of the fight against terrorism is to establish order, security, peace, and personal development, recognizing that individuals engaging in suicide attacks often suffer from underdevelopment, misinformation, and mental distress. In conclusion, this research delves into the diverse facets of counter-terrorism policies and examines potential variations in responses to these attacks by different nations.

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