Podcast Complete Transcript
President Zelensky speaking in Ukrainian…
“We owe nothing to anybody, and we will not give anything to anyone”
President Zelensky said, on the eve of Russian’s invasion.
Almost a year after the invasion of Ukraine the outcome is far from predictable.
Voice from euronews
“Russia is ready to negotiate” that’s the line from its President Vlaidimir Putin in an interview to a state-run newschannel
But Mr. Putin is not ready to negotiate.
In the words of White House National Security Official, John Kirby
“We in the United States, this administration, wants to see the war end and we would prefer to see it end though some sort of diplomatic process. But again Mr. Putin has shown no indication that he is willing to stop fighting.”
Neither side is.
To understand the current situation after almost a year from the beginning of the war,
Ti kosmos Podcast, in cooperation with the Institute of International Relations, invited Mr. Alexander Cooley, one of the leading experts in the studies of Russia and Eurasia. Todays podcast is co-hosted by Ms. Ino Afentouli, Executive Director of IDIS and me, Marilisa Anastasopoulou.
Ino Afentouli
Thank you, Alex, for being here with us today with Marilisa Anastasopoulou we have launched a series of podcasts of the Institute of Foreign Relations, International Relations, to be more precise, and we are glad to have you here for a chat on Russia and Ukraine, since you are one of the best experts, I would say, in the world on this topic. We are approaching one year of war, and we would like to have your assessment about where the war is going.
Alexander Cooley
It’s a pleasure and a privilege to be with you here in Athens and IDIS. So, yes, indeed, it’s a year, I think, the region, the world has been transformed in many ways, and so I’m happy to delve into any topic you like. I think perhaps maybe we can start by thinking through some of the differences between now and when we first started in February. I think the main concern this time last year was that there was a major build up of Russian troops around Ukraine, that over 100,000 troops were being positioned in an attempt, and this was the prevailing view to extract, some sort of concessions from the west either a security guarantee that pledge that NATO would not expand to Ukraine, some sort of agreement on the implementation of the Minsk Accords, and some sort of acknowledgment that the post-cold war agreement order had not served, had not included Russia, and that it needed some type of form of renegotiation. And so the Russians made those demands. Secretary of State Blinken took those. Of course, he did not go back on the NATO open door policy. And then, I think, very unexpectedly, we saw the sudden invasion of Russia into Ukraine.
Alexander Cooley
Well, we can further sort of explore the different elements of this, but I think what was truly stunning and what set the course for the West’s reaction was Putin’s speech on the night of the invasion that this was a maximalist campaign that this wasn’t just about the Donbas, this wasn’t just about pushing the administrative occupation line to the edge of Luhansk and Donetsk. It was rather the goal of demilitarizing entire Ukraine and denazifying Ukraine. I think this is what shocked the world and certainly Europe. This idea that the Russian army was mobilizing to come into Kiev itself and enact a regime change and typically the prevailing wisdom, and then I was part of it at the time, there was a sense that we might soon be dealing with the Zelensky government in exile. We did not know what the plans were exactly that the Russian invaders have, but we also wondered whether the Ukrainians would be able to survive 24- 48 hours. And from that point on, we saw the course of the war take what it did, which was very heavy Russian losses, the rebuffing of Russian advances by Ukrainian forces in Kiev, later in Kharkiv, some Russian gains in the south and in the east, but this immense sense of scale of what this campaign was, that this wasn’t just about the east, this is about wholesale regime change and reintegration. I think this is what shocked many, I think, in the west into their support for Ukraine.
Ino Afentouli
We had some good surprises south of this war because, as you said when it started, we were all terrified that it will end very soon and with a predictable outcome. After one year, almost one year, it’s not predictable at all. And we had one big surprise, Ukraine was a positive one. And another surprise was the weakness demonstrated to the world of the Russian military. Certainly these weaknesses create also the problem for the end of the war because Russia being weak and proven that it is weak, it’s a giant without, let’s say, content, in a way, becomes more dangerous. So what can we expect for the coming months? Escalation?
Alexander Cooley
It’s certainly a very precarious situation that we have now because as you said the overperformance of the Ukrainian military and the underperformance of the Russian military have set about real changes and expectations over what the end game might be. I think over the summer there was a real sense that the Russian army was starting to grind down the Ukrainians, especially in the east. That they were moving significant gains that the annexation of these four territories in the Russian Federation would force some type of process and negotiated settlement. And then we saw the counter offensive by Ukraine. And to be honest, the nature of military operations also resets expectations. And so you saw greater support for Ukraine after they reconquered Kherson, that they made gains, especially in the south, that they also projected power into Crimea itself, disrupting the bridge, as well as certain drone operations into Russian aviation bases in Russia itself. So there was a sense that Ukraine was not only holding its ground, that it was mounting a counter offensive. At the same time, what we saw in terms of Western support was the provision of increasing sophistication of weaponry. Right?
That previous red lines where we said, okay, we’re not going to supply air defenses, or, we’re not going to supply heavy armor, or, we’re not going to supply artillery. All those red lines have been crossed. And the concern, I think, in many parts of Europe and the states was, well, will one of these trigger the threat of a non conventional response.That was not the case. And so we’ve seen this scaling up in sophistication of weaponry and that has helped the Ukrainians in their advance. The problem that we have now is, in my view, neither side is going to get its maximalist aims. It just can’t. It doesn’t have, actually the military capability to do so. The Russians do not have the military capability to occupy the country, to take Kiev and hold it in a sustainable way, even with this new wave of military mobilization and the possibility of a spring offensive. And the Ukrainians do not have the capability to go back to pre 2014 borders. Some believe that might be possible over the long run. But when we’re talking about going all the way east in the Donbas or retaking Crimea, this is a very difficult proposition.
So the question is, what kind of process? What kind of outcome? Unfortunately, I think both sides feel that there’s more to be gained in the battlefield. And I think the Ukrainians, with some justification, feel like the Russian position is incredible, that the minute that there’s a ceasefire, Putin’s own goals have not changed, which are the reintegration of Ukraine into Russia, the re-delineation of borders, denial of Ukrainian identity, statehood. Some would call it a type of genocide. That’s where we are. So there’s a lack of process and there’s a lack of credibility in both sides perceptions. At the same time, what we’re seeing is some straining of unity within the west. The west has been extraordinarily unified. And of course, I think the Russians feel as if time is on their side, that the West will become tired of this, that the cost will mount, that the leadership change in the US. Congress will put an end to unequivocal support. So they feel that the longer that this goes on beyond even 2023, that they will be in an advantage in any kind of stalemate.
Marilisa Anastasopoulou
So this is where we are right now. We’ve seen how from the Russian side and the Ukrainian side, the military aspect works. What do you believe is going on inside Russia? The Russians are waiting for the Europeans and the west to get tired, but is Putin under threat? Do we see Russia disintegrating, as some people are saying? Can it hold? And where it’s going?
Alexander Cooley
It’s a great question, and it’s very difficult to say. So the first thing that we should note is that the information space in Russia really has been drained out. I think it puts paid to this idea that somehow information flows can go in and out unimpeded in the stage of globalization. We’ve seen the effective shutting down of any and all independent media in Russia. In fact, the only independent reporting that we have now are Russian media channels of exiles, Meduza, TV Dozhd, which have had some of their own issues. Now they retain contacts within Russia, and they’re able to conduct some investigations and some investigations remotely. But I think it’s fair to say that in the mass media, it’s 100% state control. We see public opinion. We see two interesting trends, right? One is support for the war remains relatively strong in Russia. When you ask polling questions directly on the war now, you might say, well, people are scared or concerned of answering the poll. I think there’s maybe a little bit of validity to that. But for the most part, the Russians do by the Kremlin’s line that this was inevitable, that this is a confrontation, not only with Ukraine, but principally with the west itself, that this was a long time incoming, and the showdown had to happen.
Alexander Cooley
At the same time one interesting trend that I’ve noticed since about late September, there’s much more anxiety in unease in Russian society than there was before. The Kremlin conducts a whole series of opinion polls every week, and one is known as “how do you perceive the mood of others?|”.This is the way they ask. And what we saw was, in general, a majority of Russians before September, 60-65% said that they were relatively calm, relatively content in their perceptions of how others felt. Right after mobilization, this changes, and we see the percentage of people who are worried, who see others as worried, goes way up. So mobilization, I don’t know if it’s weakened Putin so much as it’s created anxiety in Russian society. It’s affecting people. People know conscripts, those who have been mobilized. I think the other dimension that we need to be aware about is the fighting between the security services and various military and security actors within Russia itself. So we’ve seen the military take a real blow, and you’ve seen its ineffectiveness, the lack of maintenance due to sort of systemic corruption. And you’ve seen also infighting between the military itself and Wagner group that has now essentially taken over the campaign in the in Donetsk and is essentially using contracted, some would call, the mercenaries to wage the campaign.
Alexander Cooley
And so he’s very much at odds with the military too. And there’s sort of a growing rivalry there. Finally, we see real infighting between the security services, internal security services, that are being blamed for the military, for overestimating Ukraine’s willingness to be co opted. In other words, that the intelligence seemed to indicate, because Zelinsky was so unpopular, that somehow Ukrainians would welcome the Russian presence of the Russian invasion. Of course, the opposite turned out to be true. Now, is all this factionalism in Russia, will this bring down Putin, or is this likely to change the course of the war? I don’t think so. I think at the moment, we see Russians still living in a bubble, that there is some worry and some mood about others who have been mobilized. But I think the Russian public, after over 20 years of rule, we don’t see organized opposition. We don’t see protests. We don’t see significant dissent. If there is opposition to the war, it’s still silent. At the moment.
Ino Afentouli
Certainly, yeah, this is the case. But against the background of a failure, how long Russia can afford this war?
Alexander Cooley
So this is also a great question. I think you’re starting to see the signs that sanctions are taking their toll. We’ve seen a drop in GDP in the 4% range of 2022, the supply chain disruptions. I think in the west, there was, I think, an unrealistic expectation that the financial sanctions would be devastating to Russia and that there could be a quick blow. In other words, this coordinated attempt by the US. Treasury and the European Central Bank to block the reserves of the Russian Central Bank, as well as the swift sanctions on financial transactions, that somehow this would lead to a panic and a collapse in the ruble and kind of a quick, devastating action. The Russian Central Bank has proved quite skilled, actually, in weathering the crisis. They imposed capital controls. They also insisted on ruble pricing for natural gas sales, as long as those were going on in Europe. And the Russians managed to build quite a formidable reserve from the hydrocarbon revenues that they were allowed. But now you’re seeing the toll of the sanctions really starting to take their place. You’re seeing, for example, in the area of aviation, having to cannibalize other airplanes to replace airplane parts.
You’re starting to see also real frustration that whatever the schemes to get around sanctions are, there are still exceptions. For example, China, chinese companies that are global do not want to be caught violating sanctions. Right? So they’re not entering in the kinds of arrangements that the Russians has hoped. Same with India. India, yes, technically is formally neutral in the war. They’re very happy to buy discounted Russian oil, but they’re not willing to set up new payment mechanisms to skirt the sanctions and to skirt the financial control that the US has over the dollar system. So there is some attrition, and certainly the problems that we see everywhere else. Inflation, economic insecurity, the lack of ability of the middle class to travel as it once did. All of this is taking its toll. When that tipping point is, we just don’t know. And I think in situations like this, things are stable before they’re not. I can’t comment on these intelligence assessments that Putin himself might be ill or might not be, or might be on borrowed time. We’ve been saying that for a long time. But I think the mood fluctuates between having this kind of insecurity and at the same time blaming the west for this.
And I think that’s the final aspect of this. I’ll say that the association isn’t made all the time that this is Putin’s fault. It’s that the west is singling us out and punishing us. What we do know is that the oligarchs that we thought might be able to pressure Putin have not done so. We’ve seen different types of reactions. Some have opposed the war quite vocally. Others have supported the Kremlin. The Kremlin has tried to punish those who vocally oppose the war by, say, confiscating their assets and giving them to more pro-war ones. So, again, it’s so hard to know because we just don’t have insight into the dealings. But I think this situation can, even in this time of economic security, can go on a few more months.
Marilisa Anastasopoulou
When it comes to the general geopolitical order? I mean, it’s been almost a year since the beginning of the invasion. Many things have changed. How has it affected relations between Russia and other countries, in general, and the geopolitical order in the area especially?
Alexander Cooley
Would say there’s three important trends. One is unexpected Western unity. Right? And this is something that Putin himself, I think, was not banking on. What he saw, remember, in the summer of 2021 was a chaotic and unorganized pullout from Afghanistan, where the US did not give advanced warning to its allies. And you saw the headlines were Western disarray and the perceptions of a vacuum in Central Asia and Afghanistan, that the US was departing with tail between its legs and giving up. And also, Putin was also affected by 2014, when he took over Crimea, there was very little response, either by the Ukrainian military there or by the Western response. Right. So I think Western unity, we saw welcoming of Ukrainian refugees. I think they had thought that this would be a source of division in Europe, as the other refugee issue did. We saw the provision of weaponry by almost all NATO countries, even though not formally as an organization. And then we saw Sweden and Finland apply for NATO membership. So we saw this part in addition to the private sector response. And to me, this was the most surprising of all, established Western companies, even energy companies like BP and ExxonMobil leaving Russian operations within the space of a week, just quitting, stranding multibillion dollar investments there because reputationally, they thought it was detrimental to stay.
So this Western unity. On the other hand, I think it’s fair to say that many countries in the so called Global South are not as outraged. Maybe they don’t outright support Russia, but they’re sympathetic to Russia. And then why is this the case? Well, you see countries like India wanting to be a geopolitical hedge, not wanting to intervene and take sides, and just saying openly, we have economic interests. We need to import over $50 billion worth of oil every year. This is our opportunity to do so. China, their leadership is actually very sympathetic to this anti-western push. At the same time, they’re wary of the sanctions themselves. But I think there’s no doubt that the Chinese information space supports the Russian viewpoint. Other countries, like South Africa, very much support this line that Russia is a champion of anti-imperialism. Right, and that this war is an anti-imperial war. Now, the Ukrainians will say, well, this is an anti imperial war, but we’re the ones fighting the imperial power. But you see, this is overlaid with these other grievances, these other evolutions in Western order. And then I would say the third dimension of this is that and perhaps ironically, a real weakening of Russian influence in the post Soviet space before.
So beforehand, one of the reasons Russia thought of itself as a great power was that it managed a system of economic and security relationships in the former Soviet space. In the Caucasus and Central Asia, Belarus and so forth. And now you’re seeing some questioning and weakening of that, as well as instability. We see it with Nagorno Karabakh, where the Armenians are very upset that the Russians have not supported them in this renewed conflict with Azerbaijan, even though they’re supposed to be treaty partners. And we’ve seen in Central Asia between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, flare ups between two countries that are also supposed to be Russian allies, as well as concern about the future of Moldova, the future about Belarus. So in some ways, what’s happening in Ukraine has led to a sense that Russia does not control its former borders the way it used to. It does not exert that influence. And I think all countries are stuck now in this almost impossible position. On the one hand, fearing what a revisionist Russia might do actively in their country, but on the other hand, also being very wary of Western sanctions and saying, well, we have these economic ties and so forth, and not want to be caught up in that.
So the world order is, I think, being remade. One final point, I would say on this. I think there’s a little bit of an unexpected irony here in that Russia prior to the war, I would say, was actually quite successful in many of its goals. It was not economically powerful like China, but it was an opportunistic actor. It was exerting influence in parts of Africa, parts of Latin America. It was encouraging splits within the west itself by supporting anti systemic or anti Euro Atlantic parties, either on the left or on the right. But what you saw with the onset of the war, even someone like Marine Le Pen in her campaign pulled all the brochures of her and Putin because it was no longer appropriate to be associated with him. So in some ways now, I would say now Russia might be a champion for the post Western world, but I think with its diminished military power and its diminished regional influence, it’s actually going to have perhaps less of an influence in whatever world comes next than it did before as the main revisionist opposition power to the west.
Ino Afentouli
Look, this is an accurate description of the situation. You know better than us that Russia’s main strategic theater is Europe traditionally, not Asia. And they did this desperate move to Ukraine to secure the European borders, the strategic depth, if you wish. They come out up to now, defeated from this war. And also the main issue for them was a new European security architecture. They are not going to achieve that. Nevertheless, for us in the west, we need to have an accommodation of Russia. We cannot just put them in the closet, let’s say.
Alexander Cooley
Yeah, I would agree with you on both points. I think the Russians have tried to be almost theatrically demonstrative about the pivot to Asia, that we don’t need Europe anymore. That yes, we’ll join the Asian Football Confederation and send all of our guests to China now that we’re not sending it to Europe. But that doesn’t change the borders, the orientation, the real security dilemmas that we have and at some point some sort of peace agreement or at least ceasefire- because I’m less optimistic about getting a formal peace agreement- some mode of accommodation has to be reached. Now, whether this can be in the context of a broader reimagining of the security order, where the security order is not so much replaced because I don’t think any NATO or European country is going to agree to that, especially in the wake of this, but at least if we can come up with some mechanisms, of observation guarantees, some sort of international process through which we can resolve or set in place an international process that can resolve the sovereign status of Crimea or Donetsk and Luhansk. And I know my Ukrainian colleagues are not going to resolve this until all Russian troops leave, but I do think we’re going to have to parse some of the different sort of territorial gains or at least initiate a process through which they’re resolved.
And I think this is what I would remind listeners that when you look at other places like the Balkans, right, that wars and then there’s some sort of international process that then initiates another very long period of trying to work out and resolve issues. So if this is not going to be a case of redrawing a map the Ukrainian and Russian side, the question is who will be the players that are involved internationally? What access will they have? What kinds of provisions for regular monitoring will there be and how will this be tied to things that the Russians want, like sanctions relief? Right, these are all part of the potential endgame. But yes, at some point we are going to have to have serious negotiations in which both sides are going to have to give from their ideal winset. We’re just not there yet.
Marilisa Anastasopoulou
I think we can wrap it up here. Thank both Alexander Cooley and Ino Afentouli for being here today with us at IDIS podcast in cooperation with Ti Kosmos. Thank you so much. Hope to be able to talk to you again in the near future.
Alexander Cooley
Thanks for having me.
Ino Afentouli
Thank you.