- Professor A Lavdas, Panteion University
- Konstantine Lukopoulos, Lieutenant General
The widening gap between Turkey and the West over the conflict in Gaza also frames the Greek-Turkish dialogue.
Leadership summits require intensive preparations and a sense of timing. The question is what should Athens expect from a political dialogue with Ankara: Holding on to a relatively calm period? Should we expect to progress in the core agenda that moulds our relationship?
The first set of expectations is reasonable but the second would require Turkey to constrain its agenda. That is unlikely. After all, the context is not favourable. The expectation of non-hostility does not necessitate successful engagement in political dialogue, which in-and-of-itself entails threats.
We have both separately and successively articulated our reservations as to the instrumentality of this visit in the current geopolitical context. Clearly, President Erdogan of Turkey looks claims a leadership role in political Islam by playing a particular role in the conflict in Gaza. Turkey presents itself as the leader of the Islamic World against Western occupation. It is easy to interpret the significance of references to a “Second Crusade” made from Istanbul Airport, legitimating Turkish interventions in Libya, Syria, Karabakh, and culminating with reflections on the Ottoman past of Thessaloniki.
Given the earth-shattering geopolitical context and the uncertainty of developments in our region, Athens is reacting to Ankara’s initiatives with an awkward commitment to a so-called “rethink” of Greek-Turkish relations. In fact, the deepening gap between Turkey and the West over the war in Gaza will necessarily impact upon the Greek-Turkish dialogue.
Ankara has withdrawn nothing from the demands deposited on the negotiating table over time: there is a casus beli {on extending its maritime border}, a Libyan-Turkish MoU {laying claim over Greek territorial waters} and the Blue Fatherland doctrine {questioning Greek maritime sovereignty}. A few days prior to President Erdogan’s visit, the Chief of the Turkish Navy, Admiral Tatlioglu, re-articulated the demand for the demilitarisation of the East Aegean islands, referencing “grey zones” {on Greek maritime territory}, and putting Athens in a tough spot. That is also the case with Erdogan’s vitriolic rhetoric over the war in Gaza.
It is possible that the Turkish President will rhetorically attack Israel from Athens, quite aware of our strategic partnership with Israel. He may also launch a broader attack on the West in support of Hamas’ despicable terrorist attack. One hopes that those who stand by the need for this summit, in this context, have the foresight to plan for the eventuality that the Turkish President’s rhetoric will force the Greek Prime Minister to respond in kind or divert attention. Either wat, this would come at the cost of the desired “normalisation” and one should not expect Turkey to deviate from its agenda.
Turkey chooses to serve this normalisation agenda via search and rescue operations, issuing NAVTEX and NOTAM that challenge Greek jurisdiction over half the Aegean Sea (25-27 December). This revisionist stand lies at the heart of these inconspicuous tactics, refusing for instance to recognise Greek airspace jurisdiction (FIR Athens).
It should be clear that sustainable peace with Turkey is a matter of choice for its government, unilaterally withdrawing issues unilaterally posed on the negotiating table. We want to repeat our longstanding position: Athens must be relentlessly bracing to seize opportunities to advance its position to a greater or smaller extend. The summit of our political dialogue with Ankara at historical low point for Turkey’s relationship with the West may prove instrumental primarily for Erdogan’s strategy.